This paper uses the abrupt changes in health insurance coverage at age 65 arising from the Medicare program eligibility rules to evaluate the impact of insurance status on treatment intensity and health outcomes. Drawing from several million hospital discharge records for the State of California, we begin by identifying a subset of patients who are admitted through the emergency room for non-deferrable conditions-diagnoses with the same daily admission rates on weekends and weekdays. Among this subset of patients there is no discernable rise in the number of admissions at age 65, suggesting that the severity of illness is similar for patients who are just under 65 and those who are just over 65. The fraction of patients in this group who lack health insurance, however, falls sharply at age 65, while the proportion with Medicare as their primary insurer rises. Tracking health-related outcomes of the group, we find significant increases in treatment intensity at the age 65 barrier, including increases in the number of procedures performed, and total list charges. We also find a rise in the probability that patients are transferred to other units within the same hospital, coupled with a reduction in the probability of discharge to home. Finally, we estimate a drop in the rate of re-admission within one month of the initial discharge.
Although there is an extensive literature on the differences in health-related outcomes between people with and without health insurance, and between people with different forms of insurance coverage, there is still considerable uncertainty over the fraction of these differences that are caused by insurance status.
1 Patients and their health care providers have incentives to increase the use of services when insurance coverage (or more generous coverage) is available, suggesting that coverage status could plausibly affect treatment intensity. To the extent that medical services affect health, there may also be an effect on health outcomes. Nevertheless, there are substantial legal and ethical barriers to treating patients differently depending on their insurance status. 2 Moreover, people with no insurance, or with less generous coverage, differ in ways that may exaggerate the true effects of insurance status.
3
In this paper we use the abrupt shift in insurance status at age 65 that results from the eligibility rules of the Medicare program to develop new evidence on the effects of health insurance on the intensity of medical treatment provided in the hospital, and on health outcomes.
We focus on admissions through the emergency room for serious medical conditions that have similar weekend and weekday admission rates. Due to staffing constraints, hospitals prefer to admit patients with "deferrable" conditions on weekdays. The conditions for which admission is 1 See and Levy and Meltzer (2001) for reviews of the effects of insurance on health care use and outcomes.
2 For example, the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act requires hospitals with emergency rooms to provide a minimum level of care to all patients regardless of ability to pay. In public opinion polls, three quarters of Americans agree with the statement that the amount and quality of health care should not depend on ability to pay (Harris Interactive (2003) ).
just as likely on a weekend as a weekday are presumably "non-deferrable." For patients with these non-deferrable conditions we argue that the decision to present at an emergency room is unlikely to depend on health insurance status. Consistent with this assertion, there is no evidence that the arrival rate of patients increases at age 65. This is in contrast to admissions for deferrable procedures like coronary bypass surgery, which show a 20 percent jump at the Medicare eligibility limit (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2004) .
Focusing on emergency room admissions for non-deferrable conditions, we turn to an analysis of the age profiles of various case characteristics and outcomes, testing for discontinuities at age 65. The demographic composition and "diagnosis mix" of the sample trend smoothly through the age 65 barrier, as would be expected under the assumption of no differential sample selection pre-and post-Medicare eligibility. On the other hand, the fraction of patients with insurance coverage rises sharply, as does the fraction of patients who list
Medicare as their primary insurer. The number of procedures performed in hospital and total list charges also increase at age 65, suggesting that the changes in insurance status affect treatment intensity. We also find a reduction in the probability that patients are discharged to their home at age 65, coupled with an increase in the probability of being transferred to another unit within the same hospital. Finally, the probability of being re-admitted within a month of discharge drops at age 65, consistent with the view that patients with no coverage, or with relatively limited coverage, are more likely to be discharged in an unhealthy condition. Taken as a whole, we believe the results indicate relatively large effects of insurance status on treatment intensity, and potentially important effects on health outcomes.
In the next section of the paper we present a brief overview of the existing literature on the impact of insurance status on health outcomes, and describe our regression-discontinuity research design. Section 3 provides a description of the data used in the analysis, and our procedures for identifying non-deferrable emergency room admissions. Section 4 presents our main analysis of the age profiles of treatment intensity for the sub-sample of non-deferrable admissions. Section 5 concludes.
II. Measuring the Causal Effects of Health Insurance Coverage a. Previous Studies
In their recent review of the literature on health insurance and health-related outcomes, Levy and Meltzer (2001) draw a sharp distinction between observational studies and studies based on more rigorous research designs. 4 Observational studies typically compare health utilization and health outcomes between people with and without insurance coverage, adjusting for observed covariates. For example, compare survival rates of breast cancer patients with private insurance, Medicaid, and no insurance, and find higher death rates for the uninsured and Medicaid patients. 5 Even the best observational studies may be confounded by unobserved factors that simultaneously affect health, insurance status, and a 4 A similar point was made in the earlier review by . person's willingness or ability to utilize health care services. For this reason, Levy and Meltzer (2001) argue that reliable inferences about the effects of health insurance can only be drawn from experimental and quasi-experimental studies.
The only large scale randomized evaluation of the effects of health insurance, conducted by the RAND Corporation in the 1970s, compared the utilization of health care services, and health outcomes, for groups assigned to different insurance plans (Manning et al., 1987) . The RAND experiment was not designed to evaluate insurance relative to no insurance.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that the type of insurance has a substantial effect on use of services, with greater expenditures by groups assigned to plans with lower co-insurance rates.
These findings are potentially relevant for research designs based on comparisons around the Medicare eligibility age threshold, since the majority of people who enroll in Medicare at age 65 obtain supplemental coverage through a current/previous employer or a "Medigap" policy. The combination of Medicare and supplemental coverage may be more generous than a typical insurance package prior to 65, particularly with respect to co-payments and deductibles for inhospital procedures. As we discuss in more detail below, this complicates the interpretation of comparisons between people just over and just under 65, since the over-65 group has fewer people with no insurance and more with relatively generous insurance coverage.
There have been a number of prominent quasi-experimental studies of the impact of insurance coverage on the use of health care services and health outcomes. One group of studies examines the effects of the Medicaid expansions on the insurance coverage and health-related outcomes of low-income mothers and children (e.g., Currie and Gruber (1996a, 1996b) by Card, Dobkin and Maestas (2004) and Dow (2004) show that this is an artifact of the process used to construct the SSA life tables. Mortality rates in the SSA tables are smoothed within 5-year age intervals, then joined at the seams by osculatory interpolation, a method which smooths the age profile of mortality rates, but also induces artificial oscillations in the growth rate of mortality across the seams, and which leads to the impression of a trend break in the growth rate of mortality at 65 (and also at 55 and 60 -see Dow, 2004) . Comparisons based on alternative data sources show less evidence of a shift in the age profile of mortality at age 65. 6 Much of the literature on the Medicaid expansions has focused on whether the expansions crowded out other forms of coverage (e.g., Cutler and Gruber, 1996) . See Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) shorter hospital stays and facility charges, and 40% higher mortality rates than those with private insurance. If valid, these results imply that lack of insurance coverage causes very large discrepancies in the intensity and quality of care. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether conditioning on a sample of accident victims actually reduces the biases that affect simple observational comparisons between insured and uninsured hospital patients.
b. Regression Discontinuity-Based Design
Our research design builds on the existing literature, while attempting to improve on some of the limitations of earlier studies. Specifically, we implement a regression-discontinuity analysis of treatment intensity and health-related outcomes around age 65 for patients admitted to the hospital for a set of non-deferrable conditions with similar weekend and weekday admission rates. In this section we outline our methods and present a simple framework for interpreting the estimation results.
As a starting point, we posit a simple causal model of the effect of health insurance coverage on the use of health care services for a sample of hospital patients:
(1)
where y i is a measure of the quantity (or quality) of services used by patient i, X i is a set of observed characteristics of patient i (diagnosis, gender, race/ethnicity, home neighborhood, etc), a i is the age of patient i (measured in days in our empirical analysis), f(a i ; X i ) represents a flexible but smooth age profile reflecting age-related differences in underlying health (which can depend on X i ), 9 the variables C ij (j=1,2,..J) represent indicators for the type or generosity of insurance coverage held by patient i, and i is a residual component reflecting unobserved determinants of y, such as the severity of illness or differences across health care providers.
Studies of the effect of insurance coverage on the quantity or quality of health care services aim to provide causal estimates of the coverage status indicators (i.e., consistent estimates of the coefficients ( j ). The major threat for an observational design (based on ordinary least squares or matching methods) is the possibility that coverage status is correlated with the unobserved
Assuming that the distribution of unobserved factors is the same for people who are just under and just over 65, the sharp age limit for Medicare coverage at 65 provides a potential regression discontinuity research design for estimating at least some combination of the coverage coefficients. 10 To illustrate this point, Figure 1 presents the age profiles of health insurance coverage between ages 55 and 75, using data reported in the 1994-2004 March Current Population Surveys (CPS). 11 We graph the fractions of the population with each of four types of coverage: Medicare; private coverage (including employer-related or individually purchased coverage); Medicaid; and military-related coverage. (Note that people can be covered by two or more of these forms of insurance so the fractions add to more than 1). We also show the fraction with at least one form of insurance. At age 65, the fraction of people who report Medicare coverage jumps from 17% to 85%, while the fraction with any coverage rises from 85% to 98%. 12 By comparison, trends in private coverage, Medicaid coverage, and military-related coverage are all smooth, suggesting most people who have coverage before age 65 transition to a combination of Medicare and supplemental coverage once they reach 65.
To understand the implications of these patterns for the age profile of health care utilization described by equation (1) Examination of CPS data for people who do not report Medicare coverage at age 66 shows that 83% have health insurance. Most of this group is still employed, which suggests they may not have yet filed for Medicare because they continue to obtain primary coverage through their employer.
where g 1 (a i ; X i ) and g 2 (a i ; X i ) are smooth age profiles and Post65 i is an indicator equal to 1 if individual i is over 65. Since C i1 and C i2 are mutually exclusive, these equations yield an implied model for the probability of any health care of the form:
(2c) C i1 + C i2 = X i ( 1 + 2 ) + g 1 (a i ; X i ) + g 2 (a i ; X i ) + Post65 i ( 1 + 2 ) + v 1i + v 2i .
The age profile for the probability of any health insurance in Figure 1 suggests that there is positive jump at age 65, implying that 1 + 2 > 0. Moreover, to the extent that a combination of Medicare and supplemental coverage is more generous than the insurance coverage that most people have prior to age 65, there is also a discontinuous shift from limited to more generous coverage, implying that 1 > 0 and 2 < 0.
Combining equations (2a) and (2b) is a smooth function of age, the discontinuity at age 65 is = 1 1 + 2 2 , and the residual component is
Thus, to the extent that health insurance status has a causal effect on the outcome y, discontinuities in the probabilities of generous or limited health insurance coverage will generate a discontinuity in the age profile of health care utilization.
The discontinuity in the age profile of outcome y at age 65 reflects a combination of the relative size of the discontinuities in the probabilities of generous or limited insurance (i.e., 1 and 2 ) and the effects of these two types of coverage on the outcome (i.e., 1 and 2 ). Note that if 1 = 2 = , then all that matters is whether the individual has any insurance coverage. In this case, = ( 1 + 2 ), which is proportional to the size of the (observable) discontinuity in the probability of any coverage at age 65. An estimate of therefore can be recovered from the ratio of the discontinuities in the outcome y and the probability of any health care coverage. 13 At the opposite extreme, suppose that all that matters for outcome y is whether an individual has generous insurance coverage (i.e., 2 =0). In this case, = 1 1 , which is proportional to the size of the jump in the probability of generous coverage. Unfortunately, it is difficult to accurately measure this jump in the absence of detailed data on the insurance policy (or policies) held by an individual.
In this paper we do not attempt to formally identify the separate effects of any insurance coverage and more generous coverage on the intensity of treatment or on measures of health status. Rather, we focus on obtaining credible estimates of the discontinuities in these outcomes, recognizing that they can arise either through a simple coverage effect, or through a generosity of coverage effect.
Potential Problems for a Regression Discontinuity Approach
As formalized by Lee (forthcoming 2005), the key assumption underlying a regression discontinuity approach is that within the sub-sample of people who are just under or just over the discontinuity (in our context, no more than a few weeks older or younger than their 65th
13 Equivalently, can be estimated by two-stage least squares applied to equation (1), using Post65 as an instrument for coverage.
birthday), assignment to either side of the threshold is as good as random. This condition guarantees that
which are in turn sufficient conditions to ensure that the coefficients in equations (2a) and (2b) and the coefficient in equation (3) can be consistently estimated by conventional regression methods.
In a sample of hospital admission records the assumption that patients close to age 65 are "as good as randomly assigned" to either side of the age threshold is unlikely to be true if insurance status has any effect on the probability of being included in the sample. Since patients and health care providers are more likely to consider treatment if insurance is available, or if more generous coverage is available, it seems plausible that more patients, with less severe conditions, enter the hospital for treatment after age 65 (when Medicare coverage becomes available) than before. Consistent with this conjecture, Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2004) show that hospitalization rates rise discretely at age 65 for many diagnoses, including chronic ischemic heart disease, chronic bronchitis, and osteoarthrosis. Even for patients whose primary admission diagnosis is acute myocardial infarction there are roughly 5 percent more patients who are just over age 65 than just under 65 in samples of admission records from California and Florida.
In this paper we attempt to solve the sample selection problem by focusing on a subset of patients who are admitted through the emergency room (ER) for a relatively severe set of conditions that require immediate hospitalization. 14 We select a set of non-deferrable conditions with relative weekend/weekday admission rates (though the ER) of 2/5. We then test the assumption that there is no remaining selection bias associated with the age 65 boundary using two tests. First, we test that there is no discontinuity in the number of admissions at age 65.
Second, we test for discontinuities in the characteristics of patients, including the fractions with different diagnoses, and their demographic composition. Although such tests can never "prove"
that there is no remaining selection bias, they impose a reasonably high standard and provide some confidence in the validity of our inferences.
Another potential problem in regression discontinuity designs is that other factors may change discretely at the discontinuity threshold. A specific concern with age 65 is that this is the traditional retirement age. By focusing on non-deferrable ER admissions we believe that confounding due to employment status is unlikely to be a problem. In any case, we show below 
III. Data
We use hospital discharge data from the State of California. The sample includes records for all patients discharged from hospitals regulated by the State of California between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 2002. To be included in the data a patient must have been admitted to the hospital; thus, patients who were sent home after treatment in the emergency room do not appear in our sample. 15 In addition, discharges from a small number of hospitals under federal oversight, such as those on military bases, are not included in the data.
We trim this overall sample in two ways. First, we drop discharge records for patients admitted before January 1, 1992, since these admissions will only be captured if they involved a relatively long stay in the hospital. Second, we drop all discharge records for patients admitted on or after December 1, 2002, since these records will disproportionately represent shorter hospital stays (we have no record for patients who were admitted in December 2002 but were still in the hospital on December 31). The vast majority of patients admitted before November 30, 2002 were discharged by the end of December. Dropping these two groups of patients reduces our sample by about 1.1% and has almost no impact on our regression estimates.
The dataset has demographic information about the patient including age, race, ethnicity, gender and zip code of residence. The dataset also includes details about the patient's medical condition and treatment, such as principle cause of admission, up to 24 additional diagnoses, procedures performed, route of admission into the hospital, and disposition of the admission. In addition, the dataset contains a scrambled version of the patient's Social Security Number (known as an RLN) and the patient's exact birthday and date of admission. These variables make it possible to track patients who are transferred either across or within hospitals.
We track patients that are transferred either within or across hospitals, since any slippage in tracking patients across hospital stays will lead us to underestimate the impact of insurance on treatment intensity. In our data, 96% of patients have a valid RLN. For these patients, we use 15 According to a national survey of hospitals conducted by the General Accounting Office (2003), approximately 15% of the patients seen in an emergency room are admitted to the hospital.
the RLN in combination with the patient's age to search for matching records. Patients who are admitted to a hospital on the exact day that they are discharged from another hospital are coded as a readmission (and their records are combined into a single event). We track patients for up to 25 sequential stays in the hospital --the maximum number of sequential stays in our data.
It is also important to track the 4% of patients with a missing RLN, since there is a 1 percentage point drop in the proportion with a missing RLN at age 65. For each patient with a missing RLN, we look for a subsequent admission to the hospital of someone the exact same age, gender and from the same residential zip code as the patient who was discharged. Matching on these variables resulted in only 95 duplicate matches, suggesting that this set of variables is sufficient to distinguish individuals in most cases. Again, we combined sequential admissions into a single record.
VI. Results

a. Preliminary Issues
To illustrate the limitations of observational studies and motivate our quasi-experimental design, Table 1 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). As has been noted by many others (e.g., Mills and Bandhari, (2003)), the uninsured are of lower socio-economic status, engage in less healthy behaviors like smoking, and are in worse health. These observable differences suggest that the insured and uninsured also differ systematically across unobservable determinants of health outcomes, which implies observational comparisons might lead to biased estimates of the impact of insurance, even after controlling for observable characteristics.
As noted, a potential problem with using the transition to Medicare as a source of variation in insurance status is that other factors may change at age 65, including employment status and family income (which could affect treatment intensity if ability to pay has an effect on use of medical services). Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2004) present evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) that the age profile in employment rates, family income, marital status, and residential mobility all trend smoothly through the age 65 threshold. We reproduce this evidence in Table 2 , which shows regression-discontinuity estimates of the effect of reaching the Medicare eligibility age on several potential confounding variables following a flexible specification of equation (3).
b. Constructing a Non-Selective Sample of Admissions
A significant concern when comparing treatment intensity and outcomes for people who have been admitted to the hospital is that insurance status may directly affect the composition of the groups being compared. In Figure 2 we present the age profiles of the log of hospital admissions. The figure reveals a very large increase in non-emergency admissions at age 65 and a smaller increase in admissions through the emergency room. The additional admissions that occur after age 65 are likely to be systematically different than the rest of admissions, and in particular may include relatively more patients with less severe conditions. If so, this compositional change would bias our estimates of the impact of insurance.
To overcome this selection issue, we develop a method of identifying a subset of conditions sufficiently severe that individuals who present at the emergency room will be admitted to the hospital regardless of insurance status. Due to staffing constraints hospitals prefer to admit patients on weekdays. We identify non-deferrable conditions by calculating the proportion of admissions in a 5-digit ICD-9 that occur on the weekend, noting that admissions for non-deferrable conditions should be just as likely to fall on a weekend as a weekday, and therefore have weekend proportions near 2/7 (.286). In Figure 3 we show the distribution of the proportion of weekend admissions in each ICD-9 for three groups of admissions: all admissions, ER admissions, and a subset of ER admissions in ICD-9s whose weekend proportion is near 2/7.
For all admissions, the distribution is notably skewed left, indicating substantial selection in favor of weekday admissions. In contrast, the distribution for all ER admissions is clearly centered around 2/7, but still appears somewhat skewed left. To further reduce selection in the sample of ER admissions, we calculate the t-statistic of the difference between the proportion of ER weekend admissions in an ICD-9 and 2/7, then select admissions in ICD-9s whose t-statistic is less than .965 in absolute value. Table 3 regression discontinuity estimates of the impact of reaching the Medicare eligibility age on log admissions of different types following a flexible specification of equation (3). We estimate an 11.9% jump in non-ER admissions and a 2.4% jump in ER admissions. In the lower panel of the table we present the regression discontinuity estimates for admissions in the t-statistic quartiles shown in Figure 4 .
These estimates confirm that conditions for which weekend admission proportions are nearest 2/7 ( .965 t in column 7) show no statistically significant evidence of an increase in admissions at age 65. The estimates in column 8 indicate that the fraction of this group with no insurance nevertheless declines sharply at 65, confirming the validity of our research design for this group.
In the analyses that follow, we restrict our study to this group of admissions.
In Table 4 we display the average characteristics of admissions for the 10 most common conditions in our study group. Because our study group is characterized by non-deferrable conditions, the top 10 conditions are relatively severe, involving major heart problems, stroke, or respiratory problems. For each condition, we show the average length of stay, number of procedures performed, list charges, fraction who die in the hospital, and the fraction transferred across hospitals. There are very significant differences in these measures across conditions, which suggests we should include condition-level fixed effects in our analyses.
c. Changes in Treatment Intensity At Age 65
We next analyze whether changes in insurance status arising from Medicare eligibility result in changes in treatment intensity. We examine three measures of treatment intensity:
length of stay, number of procedures performed, and hospital list charges. In Figure 5A we present the age profile in length of stay for admissions in our study group. Although we use age in days in our estimation models, points on the figure represent averages over 30.43 days of age in order to make the figure more interpretable. Length of stay includes days spent at other hospitals if a patient is transferred. The fitted regression line in the figure comes from estimating a flexible specification of equation (3) that includes a second order polynomial in age (rescaled to 0 at 65) fully interacted with a dummy variable for age 65 and older. By interacting the polynomial with the age 65 dummy, we allow both the first and second derivatives of the age profile to change discontinuously at 65. The figure reveals that this specification fits the profile in length of stay well. The fitted line shows a small and statistically insignificant increase in length of stay for people admitted after they turn age 65. In Figure 5B we present the age profile in the number of procedures a patient receives. The procedures include any diagnostic or surgical procedure that the patient receives during their hospital stay. The figure shows evidence of a sharp increase in the number of procedures performed on patients admitted at age 65, though there is variation around the fitted line. In Figure 5C we present the age profile in log hospital list charges. Hospital list charges may differ from actual charges paid because insurers have negotiated discounts with hospitals. In addition, list charges do not include many other costs such as physician fees, and are not reported for managed care patients. For example Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals do not report list charges because they receive a constant capitated payment from each member whether or not the member is hospitalized. Despite these limitations, list charges should give some insight into changes in treatment intensity. The figure shows a discernible jump in list charges at age 65.
In Table 5 we present the regression results corresponding to Figures 5A-5C. We estimate a 3.9% percent increase in the average number of procedures performed at age 65, a 2.6% increase in list charges, and a 4.6% increase in length of stay, which is not statistically significant. The last set of regressions test for a discontinuity at age 65 in the proportion of admissions without charge data. We estimate a very small decrease in the proportion without charge data at age 65 and conclude this is unlikely to confound our estimates. The different model specifications show the regression estimates are very robust to the inclusion of year, month, weekend, gender and race dummies, as well as condition level fixed effects. This is evidence that observable covariates are balanced right around the age 65 threshold, and suggests selection is probably not a significant problem. The inclusion of the condition level fixed effects increases the precision of our estimates.
We next examine patterns of case disposition by comparing the probabilities that a patient will be transferred to another hospital, another unit within the same hospital, or discharged home. In Figure 6A we show the age profile in the proportion of admissions that are discharged home from the first hospital unit they are admitted to. The figure reveals an abrupt decline in the proportion of patients that are discharged home. Figure 6B presents the age profile in the proportion of admissions that are transferred to another hospital, and shows evidence of what may be a slight increase in across-hospital transfers at age 65. In contrast, Figure 6C shows a sharp jump in the proportion of patients that are transferred to another unit within the same hospital at age 65. We estimate a 2.6% drop in the probability of being discharged home at age 65 (1.7 percentage points on a base of .639), compared to a 9% increase in the probability of being transferred to either another hospital or another unit within the same hospital. When we separate acrosshospital transfers and within-hospital transfers, we find that most of the transfer effect is driven by within-hospital transfers, which jump by 19% at age 65. Across-hospital transfers increase by 5% but the estimate is not statistically significant.
d. Effects on Health
In order to understand how these changes in treatment intensity and disposition of admissions might impact health outcomes, we examine the effect of reaching the Medicare eligibility age on the probability of being readmitted to the hospital within 28 days of initial discharge, and the probability of dying in the hospital. Figure 7 displays the age profile in readmission, which suggests a small reduction in the probability of readmission among patients admitted after age 65. Table 7 confirms that this is a statistically significant drop of 5.5%.
When we shorten the readmission window to one day and one week, we find smaller and statistically insignificant effects. Figure 8 suggests a small reduction in the proportion of patients dying within the hospital at age 65, but Table 7 shows that the estimated effect of about 3.5% is not statistically significant. Interestingly, the pattern of coefficients across model specifications indicates less robustness to the inclusion of condition level fixed effects, and consequently covariates that are less well balanced around the age 65 threshold. Given that the readmission probabilities reveal that less well insured patients appear to be discharged prematurely our inability to observe deaths that occur outside the hospital is a significant limitation.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we use the discrete change in health insurance coverage generated at age 65 by the rules of the Medicare program to identify the causal effect of insurance on hospital treatment intensity, case disposition, and health outcomes. We base our findings on a subset of non-deferrable emergency room admissions in California for which we find no evidence that the probability of admission (and therefore the probability of appearing in our data) varies with insurance coverage.
Our analyses show that insurance coverage has a significant causal effect on treatment intensity, case disposition, and health outcomes. We find that uninsured patients receive less intensive treatment and are more likely to be discharged home rather than transferred to another hospital or unit within the same hospital for continued care. Coupled with our finding that the probability of being readmitted to the hospital within a month of discharge drops at age 65, our results are consistent with the possibility that patients with no coverage, or relatively limited coverage, are more likely to be discharged from the hospital in an unhealthy condition.
Federal law requires that hospitals admit and stabilize patients with life threatening conditions. It does not require that patients receive all necessary care or that they be transferred to the most appropriate treatment setting. We find that patients and their healthcare providers increase their use of hospital services when insurance coverage (or more generous coverage) is available, and that these additional hospital services appear to produce better health outcomes. Notes: To create the figures above we computed the proportion of patients admitted on the weekend for each ICD-9. We then computed the KDE of the weekend admissions proportions over the ICD-9s. We repeated the process for admissions through the ER. Notes: The points plotted in the figure are averages by age in quarters. The line is from a regression on the day level mean of length of stay. The regression includes a second order polynomial fully interacted with a dummy for age over 65. 
